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COI'~O~~~~O~S-DIR
LIABILITY-THE
ECTOR
STANDARD
OF DIRECTOR
FOR A CORPORATE
VIOLATION
OF SECTION
1982- Tillman
LIABILITY
v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th
Cir. 1975).
Plaintiff Harry C. Press, a black homeowner residing within
the geographical preference areal served by the defendant
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc. (Association) was
denied membership in the Association solely on the basis of his
race. Plaintiffs Murray and Rosalind Tillman, members of the
Association, were denied permission to bring a black guest to the
Association swimming pool solely because of the guest's race.
Both denials were made pursuant to an admittedly discriminatory policy adopted by the Association's directors and approved
by a majority of the members. In October 1969, plaintiffs sued the
Association and its directors for compensatory damages and declaratory and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Acts of
1866, 1870, and 1964.2Plaintiffs claimed that valuable property
rights available to white residents in the area served by the Association were not available to black residents of the same area.3
The district court accepted the defendants' argument that it was
a "private club" within the meaning of section 201(e) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,' and therefore outside the scope of section
1982.5 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.RThe Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Association was not a private club and that its discriminatory policies
were within the proscriptions of section 1982.7 On remand, the
1. The Association's bylaws provide that membership shall be open to bona fide
residents (whether home owners or not) of the area within a three-quarter mile radius of
the Association's pool. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U S . 431, 433
(1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, & 2000a et seq. (1970).
3. Under the Association bylaws, a resident within the preference area received three
advantages: 1) he could apply for membership without the recommendation of a current
member, 2) he received preference in applying for a membership vacancy, 3) he could pass
to a successor-buyer a first option to acquire his (the member-seller's) membership. The
plaintiffs argued that these advantages gave white residents of the preference area valuable property rights which were not available to black residents solely because of their race
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) which reads:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
5. The district court's opinion was unreported.
6. 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971)' reu'd, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
7. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973). The Su-
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district court assessed compensatory damages, costs, and
attorneys' fees against the Association, but absolved the directors
. ~ the directors had obtained two indeof personal l i a b i l i t ~Since
pendent opinions of counsel, the court found that they had exercised due diligence in attempting to comply with the law.g Seeking to hold the directors personally liable for the damages and
costs and for an additional award of attorneys' fees, the plaintiffs
appealed again. The Fourth Circuit held the directors jointly liable for the additional attorneys' fees on grounds that ignorance
of the law, although engendered by the advice of counsel, was no
defense to an action based on section 1982.'"

A.

Corporate Director Liability

The corporate director is in the unenviable position of being
exposed to allegations of liability from many sources, including
stockholders, corporate creditors, persons outside the corporation, and the corporation itself." Basically, however, director liability is divisible into two major categories. First, a director may
be directly liable to the corporation, or derivatively liable to the
stockholders as the "owners" of the corporation, for a breach of
his fiduciary duty.12The director's liability for breach of this fidupreme Court remanded the case to the district court to develop the necessary facts by
which to evaluate the claims of the parties "free of the misconception that WheatonHaven is exempt from 1981, 1982, and 2000a." Id.
8. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973).
9. Id. a t 865-66.
10. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
11. Feuer, Liabilities of Directors a n d Officers, 5 N.Y.L.F. 127, 134 (1959)
& H. SCHLAGMAN,
CORPORATE
MANAGEMENT
[hereinafter cited as Feuer]; H. FRIEDMAN
GUIDE4 13.01 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMAN]."NO custom or practice can make
a directorship a mere position of honor void of responsibility, or cause a name to become
a substitute for care and attention." Feuer 134 (quoting Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth
Trust Co., 223 N.Y. 103, 106, 119 N.E. 237, 238 (1918); accord, Litwin v. Allen, 25
N .Y .S .2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940)).
12. For example, the following acts would be a breach of the director's fiduciary duty:
1) competing with the corporation; 2) taking advantage of opportunities belonging to
the corporation; 3) profiting from inside information; 4) profiting improperly from the sale
4 12.01.
of corporate stock; 5) making improper loans to directors or officers. FRIEDMAN
See also M. FEUER,PERSONAL
OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS
28 (2d ed.
LIABILITIES
235 (2d
H. HENN,LAWOF CORPORATIONS
1974) [hereinafter cited as PERSONAL
LIABILITIES];
LIABILITY
OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS
AND
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN];W. KNEPPER,
DIRE~OR
$ 4S1.03, 1.05 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as KNEPPER];
Isreals, A New Look
a t Corporate Directorship, 24 Bus. LAW.727, 732 (1969).
States are becoming aware of the desirability of imposing fiduciary standards on
corporate directors by statute. PERSONAL
LIABILITIES
30. South Dakota has a representative
statute which imposes liability on directors for: 1 ) making improper dividend
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ciary duty is usually defined by a "reasonable man" standard:
the director must exercise the degree of care an ordinarily prudent
man would exercise in managing his own affairs? In some situations, the "reasonable man" standard has been expanded by the
"business judgment rule." Under this rule, directors will not, in
areas of managerial discretion, be liable for errors in judgment
which were made in good faith, with due diligence, and for the
benefit of the corporation.14Directors are also generally absolved
of liability for reliance on the advice of experts, such as accountants and attorneys, even though the advice may be errone~us.'~
Director liability in the second category arises from dealings
with, or actions against, third persons.I6 This liability usually is
-

-- -

-

distributions; 2) improperly acquiring corporate stock; 3) making loans to corporate
directors; or 4) commencing business before obtaining minimum capital. S.D. COMPILED
LAWSANN.§ § 47-5-15 to -21 (1967).
13. Comment, Trends in Corporate Director Liability, 17 S.D.L. REV.468, 470-71
(1972). This standard, however, varies according to the particular facts and circumstances
of the situation. The factors which should be considered are listed in the leading case of
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940):
It has been said that a director is required to conduct the business of the corporation with the same degree of fidelity and care as an ordinarily prudent man
would exercise in the management of his own affairs of like magnitude and
importance. General rules, however, are not altogether helpful. In the last analysis, whether or not a director has discharged his duty, whether or not he has been
negligent, depends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the
kind of corporation involved, its size and financial resources, the magnitude of
the transaction, and the immediacy of the problem presented. A director is
called upon "to bestow the care and skill" which the situation demands.
Id. a t 678 (citation omitted).
In some jurisdictions, liability for errors in judgment is imposed only for gross negligence. See, e.g., Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 75, 376 P.2d
162, 165-66 (1962); Sellers v. Head, 261 Ala. 212, 216, 73 So. 2d 747, 750 (1954); Allied
Freightways, Inc. v. Cholfin, 235 Mass. 630, 634, 91 N.E.2d 765,768 (1950). For a discussion of the scope of this standard see Dyson, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40
LIABILITIES
29IND. L.J. 341, 372-76 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dyson], and PERSONAL
30.
14. FRIEDMAN
8 11.03[3]; KNEPPER8 1.05; PERSONAL
LIABILITIES
32-33. But see Dyson
367-71. The language most often cited comes from Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113,
124, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (1912), where the New York Court of Appeals said:
Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or action, adequacy
of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate funds to advance corporate
interests are left solely to their [the directors'] honest and unselfish decision,
for their powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the
exercise of them for the common and general interests of the corporation may
not be questioned, although the results show what they did was unwise or
inexpedient.
15. Diamond v. Davis, 62 N.Y.S.2d 181, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Epstein v. Schenck, 35
N.Y.S.2d 969, 980-81 (Sup. Ct. 1939); PERSONAL
LIABILITIES
96-99; KNEPPER8 1.09.
CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAWOF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS
16. See generally 3 W. FLETCHER,
FRIEDMAN
8 13.03.
1134 (rev. ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER];
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asserted in one of three situations: 1)when the director attempts
to bind the corporation to ultra vires acts, 2) when the director
assumes personal liability for a corporate obligation, and 3) when
the director commits a tort in the scope and course of his employment.17 The present case focuses on tortious conduct.
A corporate director is personally liable for his own torts,
even though the corporation may also be liable.18The director is
likewise personally liable for torts of the corporation which he
inspires, authorizes, directs, or in which he actively participates
or acquiesces.lg Director liability for tortious acts of the corporation, however, has generally been restricted to c b e s involving
physical injury, rather than pecuniary harm, to third persons.2n

B. Section 1982
The statutory provision under which the present case arose,
42 U.S.C. 8 1982, is intended to protect all citizens from raciallymotivated deprivations of property rights.21 After a century of
applying this statute solely to state action, the United States
Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,22 expanded its
scope by ruling that a private refusal to sell property to a black
. ~ ~ Court justified this expanbecause of race was p r ~ h i b i t e dThe
17. FRIEDMAN
§ 13.03, a t 303.
Liability is also imposed by some federal statutes, including securities legislation,
e.g., Securities Act of 1933 $8 5,11,15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77k; Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp.,
283 F. Supp. 643, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); antitrust and trade statutes, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405,407 (1962); Forte,
Liabilities of Corporate Officers for Violations of Fiduciary Duties Concerning the Antitrust Laws, 40 IND.L.J. 313 (1965); Rooks, Personal Liabilities of Officers and Directors
for Antitrust Violations and Securities Transactions, 51 ILL. B.J. 626 (1963); and the
Internal Revenue Code, e.g., INT.REV.CODEOF 1954, $ 5 6671(b), 6672; United States v.
Graham, 309 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
§ 1135; HENN5 218.
18. FLETCHER
19. Tedrow v. Deskin, 265 Md. 546, 550, 290 A.2d 799, 802 (1972). Oft-cited language
is found in Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1958):
Specific direction or sanction of, or active participation or cooperation in, a
positively wrongful act of commission or omission which operates to the injury
or prejudice of the complaining party is necessary to generate individual liability
in damages of an officer or agent of a corporation for the tort of the corporation.
20. Macey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 507 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. 1974); RESTATEMENT
OF AGENCY,
Appendix, Reporter's notes § 357 (1958). But see Lobato v. Pay Less
(SECOND)
Drug Stores, Inc. ,261 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1958);Tedrow v. Deskin, 265 Md. 546,290 A.2d
799 (1972).
21. See generally 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV.141.
22. 392 U S . 409 (1968).
23. The Supreme Court has never considered the actual limitations on the scope of
section 1982 when a truly private club has been involved. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229,236 (1969) and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S.
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sion by stressing the importance of maintaining property rights
free of interference from any source, governmental or private.24

raised their exercise of due
In the instant c a ~ e , ~ ? h directors
e
diligence as their primary defense against imposition of liability
adopting the discriminatory
for violating section 1982.2"efore
policies, the directors had obtained the opinions of two attorneys
who independently agreed that the Association's policies would
not be
Moreover, these opinions of counsel were initially
sustained by both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals. On remand, the district court concluded that reliance
on the opinions, although ultimately held erroneous, was justified:
If the director does not know, and if in the exercise of due diligence could not have known that his action was wrongful or
illegal, he cannot be held liable for the torts of the corporation. . . .
[Tlhe defendant directors did not know nor in the exercise of
due diligence could not have known that the adoption of racially
restrictive policies was illegal.28

The majority on the Fourth Circuit panel rejected the defendants' contentions. The court reasoned that a violation of section
1982 constitutes an intentional tort and that due diligence, under
general tort law, is a defense only in actions for negligen~e.~'
Relying on Aeroglide Corp. v. Zeh,30the court asserted that if a
director voluntarily and intentionally causes the corporation to
431, 438 (1973), involved associations claiming private club status; the Supreme Court,
however, rejected those claims. The same thing happened in a section 1981 case, Daniel
v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). Nevertheless, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U S . 163
(1972), the Supreme Court held that a private club was exempt from the restrictions of
section 1983. Since the courts have never treated sections 1981 and 1982 differently from
section 1983, the logical conclusion is that truly private clubs are also exempt from the
restrictions of sections 1981 and 1982.
24. 392 U S . a t 423-24.
25. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
26. 517 F.2d a t 1143. The defendants adopted the reasoning of the district court
opinion, 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973), in toto, and added the argument that the issue
of director liability was moot, since the satisfaction of a judgment against the corporation
OF JUDGMENTS
released the directors who were the joint tort-feasors, citing RESTATEMENT
4 95 (1942). Brief for Appellees a t 9-11.
27. 517 F.2d a t 1148 (Boreman, J., dissenting).
28. 367 F. Supp. a t 865 (citations omitted).
29. 517 F.2d a t 1144.
30. 301 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1962).
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act, he can be held personally liable? The majority justified the
imposition of liability on two grounds: 1)the plaintiffs should not
be denied the fruits of their victory in the Supreme Court, and
2) anything short of the imposition of liability would allow corporate officials to violate the restrictions of section 1982 with personal impunity.J2
Senior Circuit Judge Boreman dissented, contending that
fault, as evidenced by a "positively wrongful" act, must be present in every tort, whether negligent or intentional, before liability
could be imposed. Based on the facts of the instant case, the
directors' actions could not be considered "positively wrongful."J:%

The major issue in the present case is whether the exercise
of due diligence should be a defense in a personal action against
directors for corporate violations of section 1982 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. This case note will examine the court's rationale for rejecting the due diligence defense, discuss the justifications for an alternative standard of liability for corporate directors, and explore some of the implications of the present case for
director liability in areas beyond the civil rights context.
A. The Fourth Circuit's Rationale for
Rejecting the Due Diligence Defense
1. An intentional tort

In the introductory paragraphs of its analysis, the Fourth
Circuit categorized an action under section 1982 as an intentional
. ~ ~ premise, with the subsequent
tort, citing Curtis v. L ~ e t h e rThis
application of general tort principles, became the primary justification for the court's decision. Although this type of action may
be analogous to several forms of common law tort actions,Vhere
is very little precedent for treating a section 1982 suit as the
equivalent of an intentional tort action. In the absence of a definitive pronouncement by the Supreme Court, the validity of such
a categorization is at least debatable.Vf the majority erred in
31. 517 F.2d at 1144.
32. Id. at 1145.
33. Id. at 1150. On a motion for rehearing en banc, which was denied, Judges Russell,
Field, and Widener joined in Judge Boreman's dissent. Id. at 1154.
34. 415 US. 189 (1974).
35. Id. at 194; Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1117 (7th Cir. 1972).
36. See generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the Background of Tort Liability, 50
IND. L.J. 5 (1974).
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classifying this action as an intentional tort, the court loses its
major justification for disallowing the due diligence defense and
imposing liability on the directors.
Even if, however, the majority correctly presumed that a
violation of section 1982 is a statutory intentional tort, the unavailability of a due dilegence defense cannot be automatically
assumed. The plaintiffs sought to impose liability on the directors
for a tort of the corporation, a situation dissimilar from the majority of common law tort actions. This difference arguably may or
should preclude the blanket adoption and application of all general tort principles. In other words, even if a section 1982 action
is properly classified as an intentional tort, the due diligence
defense may be an appropriate avenue for avoiding liability. The
justifications for this position will be discussed in section 111, B,
1 below.

2. The fruits of victory
The circuit court's second justification for imposing liability
on the Association's directors was to assure to the plaintiffs the
fruits of their victory in the Supreme
Since the court did
not elaborate, one can only speculate as to what the court meant.
The court was probably concerned that the money judgment
awarded in the district court would be jeopardized unless personal liability was imposed on the directors.
The circuit court's decision in the present case, however,
failed to materially affect the plaintiffs' chances for recovery. In
a judgment designed to compensate the plaintiffs for their outof-pocket costs, embarrassment, and humiliation, the district
court awarded $5,356 in compensatory damages, $2,658.12 in
court costs, and $200 in attorneys' fees, while specifically denying
an award of punitive damages.3nThe burden of this award was
placed solely on the Asso~iation,~~
but the corporation was at all
times able and willing to pay all damages, even if a judgment of
joint liability were entered."'Given these facts, the plaintiffs
would not have been deprived of any "fruits" if the court had
refused to impose personal liability.
37.
38.
39.
40.

517 F.2d at 1145.
367 F. Supp. at 864-65; Brief for Appellees at 2.
367 F. Supp. at 866.
Brief for Appellees at 7.
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3. Deterrence of future violations

Finally, the court expressed a concern that the application
of section 1982 would be severely restricted if liability were not
imposed on the directors because the statute could then be vioin an effort to deter future viola'
lated with i m p ~ n i t y . ~Thus,
tions, the court subjected the directors to personal liability. The
court failed, however, to persuasively demonstrate how its excessively harsh standard, discussed in greater detail below, will deter
future violations of the statute more effectively than a less burdensome standard.

B. A Reasonable Standard of Director Liability
1. The requirement of fault
Assuming that a violation of section 1982 does constitute an
intentional tort, one is confronted with the threshold consideration raised by Judge Boreman in dissent:
Some element of fault or culpability is present in every tort.
Even where the law imposes traditional absolute liability culpability is still a requisite element.42

In circumventing this argument, the majority relied upon
Aeroglide Corp. v. Zeh" for the proposition that if the director
voluntarily and intentionally caused the corporation to act, that
alone is sufficient to impose personal liability; there is no need
to additionally establish the director's knowledge of wrongfulness? In Aeroglide, a creditor-manufacturer sued a corporation
and its directors personally for conversion of a secured asset. The
Second Circuit held:
That there was no direct evidence in the record that the directors were aware of Aeroglide's security interests is not determinative. The tort of conversion requires no intent or fault. The
determinative question then is whether these directors personally participated in the conversion. . . .45

The majority failed to recognize, however, that Aeroglide
represents a solitary aberration. In all other cases in which direc41. The court specifically said: "The claim that a corporate official may violate 1981
and 1982 with impunity because he exercised due diligence . . . is designed to severly
restrict the application of these statutes." 517 F.2d a t 1145.
42. 517 F.2d a t 1150 (citation omitted).
43. 301 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1962).
44. 517 F.2d a t 1144.
45. 301 F.2d a t 422.
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tors have been held liable for corporate torts, the directors were
not merely unwitting participants in tortious corporate action;
they invariably knew that the action was illegal. For example, in
, ~ ~president of a
Patrons State Bank & Trust Co. v. S h a p i r ~the
bank was sued for conversion. The court imposed liability upon
finding that the president knew that his act was illegal.
Shapiro as president wrongfully reassigned the proceeds from
one assigned contract to another bank . . . . Shapiro told the
officers of the bank that the proceeds from the assigned contracts had not yet been received by the corporation when in fact
they had.47

Likewise, in Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Machinery C ~ r p .an
, ~action
~
alleging the misappropriation of trade secrets, the district court
held a corporate vice-president personally liable for the tort. It is
apparent throughout the opinion that the court was relying on the
fact that the vice-president not only initiated the entire scheme,
but did so knowing of its illegal it^.^^
In short, the Fourth Circuit disregarded the well-established
rule that personal liability is generally imposed only when the
; ~ court imdirectors knew that they were acting u n l a ~ f u l l ythe
posed liability on the directors in the face of their reasonable
efforts to ascertain the legality of their actions. Consequently, the
directors' liability was identical to the liability that would have
been imposed had they acted with the knowledge that their actions were illegal.
2. An excessively harsh standard

Although the Fourth Circuit attempted to justify the imposition of personal liability as a means of deterring future violations
of section 1982, it appears that the court went further than necessary. Because of the strictness of the test, corporations not sub46. 215 Kan. 856, 528 P.2d 1198 (1974).
47. Id. a t 1204.
48. 240 F. Supp. 126 (D. Wis. 1965).
49. Another case involving director liability for an intentional tort is Macey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1974) (officer absolved of liability for inducing
breach of contract because he acted in good faith).
50. There are numerous cases where liability was imposed because the director should
have known a dangerous condition existed or otherwise acted negligently. See, e.g., Dwyer
v. Lanan & Snow Lumber Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 838, 297 P.2d 490 (1956) (president knew
high voltage wire was dangerous and yet did nothing); Allen v. Morris Bldg. Co., 360 Mich.
214, 130 N.W.2d 491 (1900) (president willfully participated in grading land which caused
water damage to adjacent property).
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ject, for one reason or another, to the prohibitions of the Civil
Rights Acts may forego plans to adopt similar policies rather than
subject their directors to the possiblity of personal liability. Thus,
the decision in the instant case may chill legitimate attempts to
limit the size and composition of purely private groups or associations. It may be argued that any such attempts should be disfavored by the law in all cases. Nevertheless, since Congress has
seen fit to exempt private associations from the restrictions of the
Civil Rights Acts," efforts by the membership of these associations to delineate their composition should be protected.
A hypothetical standard for director liability that can be
derived from the facts of the instant case further illustrates the
excessive harshness of the Fourth Circuit's standard and the
weakness of its "deterrent effect" argument. The directors based
their discriminatory decision on the independent opinions of two
attorneys, a majority of prior court decisions, and a century of
custom.52In short, they did all they reasonably could do to insure
that their actions were within the bounds of the law. Their conduct demonstrated, in fact, the utmost in diligence. If such conduct, or "utmost diligence," were adopted as the standard for
determining personal director liability for corporate torts, directors would be rewarded, with protection from liability, for taking
the most reasonably cautious measures within their power. On
the other hand, directors would be penalized for, and thus
arguably deterred from, exercising anything less than utmost diligence. Indeed, it appears that the deterrent effect of this utmost
diligence standard is the maximum possible, since the standard
punishes, and therefore deters, all avoidable wrongdoing. Obviously, the standard does not reach conduct not reasonably
avoidable, but such conduct cannot be deterred by threat of punishment in any event. By way of contrast, the standard applied
in the present case does not protect directors from personal liability even though they take all reasonable precautions to avoid
wrongdoing. Thus, the standard of the present case is more harsh
than the utmost diligence standard posited above. Yet, if the
hypothetical utmost diligence standard does indeed have a
maximum deterrent effect, the added harshness of the Fourth
Circuit's standard-admittedly fashioned for its deterrent effect
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) provides that "[tlhe proyisions of this subchapter shall not
apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public . . . ." See
6 GA. L. REV.813 (1972).
52. 517 F.2d 1141, 1151-52 (Boreman, J., dissenting).

330

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

-cannot be justified. This additional harshness can only be
viewed as excessive, an example of judicial overkill.
3. Reliance on the advice of counsel

The facts of the instant case highlight a common occurence
in corporate operations. Because most directors have only limited
amounts of time to devote to their duties, they are generally
unable to be thoroughly familiar with every business, legal, and
financial aspect of the corporation. As a result, directors frequently come to rely on the opinions, advice, and work-product
of experts.53Generally, these specialists are correct in their judgments, but occasionally they make an error. What should be the
responsibility of a director when injury results from such an expert's error in judgment? The court in the present case held that
the director should be personally liable and that reliance on the
advice of experts is no defense.54Other courts have resolved this
question differently.
For example, in Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum &
Transport Co. ,55a stockholders' derivative action, certain corporate directors were charged with fraudulent and intentional waste
of corporate assets, profits, and business opportunities. In pleading the defense of good faith and due diligence, the defendant
directors pointed to advice from counsel that the exploration of
the business opportunities alleged to have been wasted would
have been a violation of the antitrust laws. This factor influenced
the court's decision that the directors had acted in good faith and
in the honest exercise of their discretion and that no liability
corporate
should be imposed.56Also, in Gilbert u. Burn~ide,~'
directors were sued by stockholders who alleged that the directors
wasted the assets of the corporation pursuant to an unlawful
reorganization plan. In adopting the plan, the directors had relied
on counsel's advice in good faith. The court absolved the directors
of liability, holding that "[r]eliance upon advice of counsel is a
,~~
sued
good defense ."58 Likewise, in Spirt v. B e ~ h t e lstockholders
the corporate directors for breach of their fiduciary duty, alleging
53. Feuer, supra note 11, at 164.
54. 517 F.2d at 1146.
55. 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
56. Id. at 294, 56 N.E.2d at 716.
57. 13 App. Div. 2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1961).
58. Id. at 983, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 432, citing Blaustein v. Pan Am Petroleum & Transp.
Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944), as authority.
59. 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956).

3201

CASE NOTES

331

that the directors improperly handled the tax benefits of stock
options. Counsel had advised that the directors' method of handling the options, although accruing to the benefit of the directors, was the only proper method. The court said:
Counsel's opinion as to the law (even though erroneous) should,
in our opinion, protect the officers acting in reliance upon itsen

In each of these cases, the court absolved the corporate directors
of liability where they had in good faith relied on the advice of
counsel
Arguably, these cases are not relevant to the present case
because each involves an action brought by stockholders rather
than by persons outside the corporation. Nevertheless, these
cases should be deemed applicable for two important reasons.
First, one of the theories on which plaintiffs Murray and Rosalind
Tillman asserted director liability was that the directors had improperly depleted the Association's assets and each member's
equity by subjecting the corporation to liability under section
1982." In advancing this theory, the Tillmans assumed the position of "stockholders," bringing this case squarely within the reasoning of Blaustein, Gilbert, and Spirt.
Second, the issue of reliance on counsel's advice appears to
be one of first impression in the context of director liability for
corporate torts. Although the court could have analogized to the
directors' duty to the corporation and its stockholders, by failing
to do so the Fourth Circuit effectively adopted a new and stricter
standard of personal director liability. Since the director's duty
to the corporation is a fiduciary one, requiring the highest degree
there would appear to be
of competence, loyalty, and diligen~e,'~
no sound reason for requiring a director to meet a higher standard
in his dealings with persons outside the corporation.
60. Id. a t 247. The court cited, as an example, an illustration in RESTATEMENT
OF
TRUSTS5 201 absolving a trustee of liability because he relied on counsel's opinion as to
LIBILITIES,
supm note 12, a t 96-101.
what investments were legal. Id. See PERSONAL
61. Indeed, it could be argued that directors who do not seek and rely on expert advice
should be liable for negligence. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667,699 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
Directors represent the interests of owners and are expected to comply with the legal
requests of those owners. Often, the legality of these requests can be ascertained only by
asking expert advisors. In the present case, the directors were trying to adopt a policy
approved by a majority of the members. Brief for Appellees at 8-9.
62. Brief for Appellees a t 8-9.
63. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 11, a t 5 11.01; KNEPPER,
supra note 12, a t $ 1.01.
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C. Possible Consequences of the Fourth Circuit's Decision
The previous discussion has attempted to point out the
weaknesses of the Fourth Circuit's position and outline some of
the reasons a different standard should have been used. This is
not to say, however, that the court's ultimate decision was erroneous. The courts have been zealous in their use of the Civil
Rights Acts to overcome a long history of racial discrimination,
and it should not be forgotten that the instant case arose in a
context of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, the possible consequences of the court's decision, if it is applied to cases not dealing
with civil rights, are sufficiently undesirable to warrant limiting
the decision to that context. Some of those consequences are discussed below.
1.

Unreasons ble burden on corporate directors

The Securities Act of 1933 is analogous to section 1982 in that
it provides protection to purchasers of corporate securities, who
are generally outside the corporation, from tortious or fraudulent
11of the Securi.~~
acts of the corporation and its d i r e ~ t o r sSection
ties
is designed not so much to compensate the defrauded
purchaser as to deter negligence and fraud, by imposing liability
upon corporate directors and other persons participating in the
illegal distribution of a registered security? Nevertheless, Congress provided a due diligence defense to section 11 actions, because anything less than that would be an imposition of insurer's
liability, which would "obviously have imposed an unjust and
insurmountable burden on those who have the responsibility for
the conduct of the corporate enterprise?'
Imposition of such an onerous burden is also a likely consequence of the court's action in the present case. The court stated
that directors are liable for injury even though they make every
64. See lob us v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. $4 77a-aa.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1933).
66. See Globus v. Law Research Sew. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969).
67. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.WASH.L.
REV.29, 48 (1959); see 15 U.S.C. § 77k (b), (c). There was a bitter struggle between the
Senate and the House over the civil liability that should be imposed on the officers and
directors of the registrant. The Senate wanted to impose insurer's liability but acquiesced
in the House version which allowed the due diligence defense. Landis, supra; H.R. REP.
No. 152,73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933). See generally Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E. C. Liability Insurance in the Light of BarChris and Globus,
24 Bus. LAW.681, 687-88 (1969).
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reasonable effort to be within the bounds of the law. If the court's
general language is extended to its logical conclusion, a director
will be liable not only for racial discrimination but for every other
tort of the corporation as well. The only possible relief may be an
indemnification agreement with the corporation, but these are
increasingly being held to be against public policy?
2.

Effect on the competence of corporate directors

In describing the conflict between the stockholders' interests
and director discretion, one author has noted:
There is a natural inclination to protect a stockholder from the
infringement upon his interest caused by the acts of the negligent director. On the other hand it is recognized that the exercise of the director's discretion reflects the competence, agressiveness, and efficiency of American industry and that to subject the director to personal libility for a mistake in judgment
is to intimidate him and to create a highly conservative business
climate resulting in failure to exploit opportunities involving
more than a small degree of risk. Furthermore, [personal] liability for errors in judgment would tend to discourage able individuals from accepting the position. In this scenario society
emerges as the loser.6s

This language suggests two possible consequences of the circuit
court's decision: 1) directors may be forced to adopt a highly
conservative attitude,'O and 2) better qualified individuals will
be less willing to serve as corporate directors.'l The threat of liability will inevitably be a significant concern to the competent
individuals needed t o fill corporate leadership positions.
3. Effect on attorney-director relationships

Of additional concern is the possible effect of the instant case
on attorney-director relationships. If a director cannot be relieved
68. See generally FRIEDMAN,
supra note 12, at 4 14.04[2]; Bishop, Sitting Ducks and
Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Oficers, 77
YALEL.J. 1078 (1968); Comment, supra note 13, at 478.
69. Comment, supra note 13, at 470. See also Dyson, supra note 13, at 346-47.
70. See Adkin & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 20
Bus. LAW.817, 821 (1965) ("Howerever, if a director acts objectively, carefully (but not
necessarily overcautiously) and diligently, his management of the corporation's affairs
should be immune from attack.").
On the other hand, directors could adopt extremely liberal policies, disregarding
possible personal liabilities since due diligence will not relieve them of liability. Stockholder control makes this possibility unlikely, however.
LIABILITIES,
supra note 12, at 37.
71. See PERSONAL
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of liability for relying on counsel's opinion, should the director be
indemnified by the attorney who incorrectly interpreted the
The attorney's function in negotiation and documentation
of corporate ventures is a vital one,73since corporate directors and
presidents may not be trained in the law and cannot reasonably
be expected to be personally knowledgeable on all legal matters
touching their business affairs. If, however, corporate directors
are to be held personally liable, along with the corporation, for
relying on the advice and substantiated opinions of corporate
attorneys, that important relationship will certainly be undermined. Attorneys will be more reluctant to give unqualified opinions and directors will be equally reluctant to rely on opinions
given.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the standard of director liability of the present case is
narrowly confined to the civil rights context, the decision may
have minor impact. But narrow application of the standard is by
no means assured. Unless the scope of the case is limited by
future decisions, it may be used to impose liability on corporate
directors whenever the erroneous advice of experts causes a corporation to breach a contract or commit a trespass. Such an application of the standard, in a nonracial context, is unwarranted and
unwise. The holding of the present case should be limited to the
peculiar context in which it arose.
72. For a general discussion of the importance of legal opinions in business transactions, see Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions-An Attempt to Bring Some
Order Out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAW.915 (1973).
73. See generally Bernant, The Role of the Opinion of Counsel: A Tentative
Reevaluation, 49 CALIF.S.B.J. 132 (1974).

